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THE CONSUMER FINANCIAL PROTECTION
BUREAU: A NOVEL AGENCY DESIGN WITH
FAMILIAR ISSUES
Thomas Arning*
ABSTRACT
This Note examines the structure of the Consumer Financial
Protection Bureau, with a specific focus on its single-director
structure. The balance of authority between agencies and the three
branches of government has been a point of contention for
generations, especially since the early twentieth century. This area of
the law became even more contested following the financial crisis in
2008. As part of the response to the perceived abuses that led to the
global recession, Congress created the Consumer Financial Protection
Bureau, ultimately opting to give it a single director as opposed to a
board structure. Proponents of this regime cite a need for a robust and
unfettered regulatory entity. Opponents argue that the single director
structure grants too much authority to one individual within the
administrative state.
This Note analyzes both sides of the debate regarding the singledirector structure of the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau. First,
this Note begins with a discussion of the jurisprudence on the area of
agency authority, specifically as it relates to single-director agencies.
Next, it summarizes two major ideological camps that diverge in
determining the most effective structure of these agencies. The first
group, which this Note terms “legalists,” argues for an analytical
framework derived only from the relevant precedent and the
respective statutory mandates. The second group, which this Note
terms “protectionists,” argues that agencies must be protected from
capture, placing an imperative on the measures most likely to avoid
this. Finally, this Note takes a third approach, arguing that the size of
the potential regulatory impacts must be taken into account when
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deciding on the structure of a financial regulatory authority.
Ultimately, this Note applies the third approach to the Consumer
Financial Protection Bureau, suggesting that its single-director
structure is unconstitutional. This is primarily due to the director’s
vast amount of unilateral authority, combined with the organization’s
lack of political accountability.
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INTRODUCTION
The United States experienced two major financial disasters in the
first ten years of the twenty-first century that would forever transform the
financial regulatory state. In 2002, Texas-based energy giant Enron
collapsed amid one of the largest corruption scandals in American history,
bringing down its auditor, Arthur Andersen. In 2008, the American
mortgage crisis brought about one of the worst financial downturns since
the Great Depression. Public outcry following these events led Congress
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to create a new regulatory entity: the Consumer Financial Protection
Bureau (CFPB, or the “Bureau”).1 Along with the Public Company
Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB), these agencies brought about
sweeping regulatory changes and fundamentally transformed the way
many of the largest American financial institutions conduct business. As
with all major regulatory mandates, the PCAOB and CFPB have been
subject to intense criticism for their respective scopes of authority.
Two major regulatory issues dominate the debates over these
agencies.2 The first issue is whether the PCAOB’s initial organizational
structure impermissibly restricted the President from removing members
of the board.3 The Supreme Court has long held that for-cause removal
restrictions are constitutionally permissible.4 In Free Enterprise Fund v.
Public Company Accounting Oversight Board, however, the Supreme
Court struck down the PCAOB’s structure, holding that it impermissibly
restricted the President’s Article II authority to remove inferior officers
in the executive branch.5 The second major regulatory issue is whether
the CFPB’s single-director structure, as opposed to being led by a board,
is constitutional.6 In 2016, the D.C. Circuit held that the single-director
structure was unconstitutional in PHH Corporation v. Consumer
Financial Protection Bureau.7 The D.C. Circuit later reversed this
decision in en banc review, holding that Congress’ decision to implement
a single-director structure of the CFPB was a valid exercise of its Article
I authority.8 The debate regarding the CFPB’s structure largely revolves
1. See Creating the Consumer Bureau, CONSUMER FINANCIAL PROTECTION
BUREAU,
https://www.consumerfinance.gov/about-us/the-bureau/creatingthebureau/
[https://perma.cc/3LB6-BWYE] (last visited Dec. 30, 3018).
2. See Rachel E. Barkow, Insulating Agencies: Avoiding Capture Through
Institutional Design, 89 TEX. L. REV. 15, 16 (2010).
3. This is generally referred to as “for-cause” removal.
4. Humphrey’s Ex’r v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 632 (1935).
5. 561 U.S. 477, 478 (2010).
6. See generally PHH Corp. v. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, 881 F.3d
75 (D.C. Cir. 2018) [hereinafter PHH II]; PHH Corp. v. Consumer Financial Protection
Bureau, 839 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 2016) vacated en banc, 881 F.3d 75 (D.C. Cir. 2018)
[hereinafter PHH I].
7. PHH I, 839 F.3d at 8.
8. See PHH II, 881 F.3d at 84 (“Congress’s decision to establish an agency led by
a Director removable only for cause is a valid exercise of its Article I legislative power.
The for-cause removal restriction fully comports with the President’s Article II executive
authority and duty to take care that the consumer financial protection laws within the
CFPB’s purview be faithfully executed.”).
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around how to best maintain agency independence, specifically, whether
checks on policy agendas should come from within a deliberative
governing board, or from the political branches of government.9 There is
also debate about how to best protect financial regulatory agencies from
capture by special interests.10 The court also held that limiting the
President’s ability to remove the director only “for cause” did not
impermissibly restrict the President’s Article II authority to remove
inferior officers.11 The crucial function of financial regulatory agencies
has important policy and legal implications within corporate law.12 The
federal judiciary has emphasized the importance of independence in all
regulatory areas, but has stated that independence is of particular
importance in financial regulatory agencies.13
Scholars who argue that a single agency director is permissible often
look to the statutory framework pertaining to the respective agencies.14
Specifically, advocates of the single director structure argue that the
agency’s enacting statute should determine the agency structure and
protocol for removing officers, so long as these provisions comply with
Article II of the Constitution.15 Adherents to this viewpoint generally
reject a philosophy that balances the President’s authority as the “unitary
executive,” and instead emphasize Congress’ inherent ability to check the
executive.16 Those who argue for board governance generally believe that
9.
10.
11.
12.

See generally PHH II, 881 F.3d 75; PHH I, 839 F.3d 1.
PHH II, 881 F.3d at 110-11.
Id.
See id. at 78 (“Congress has historically given a modicum of independence to
financial regulators . . . [T]hat independence shields the nation’s economy from
manipulation or self-dealing by political incumbents.”).
13. See id.
14. See, e.g., Kirti Datla & Richard L. Revesz, Deconstructing Independent Agencies
(And Executive Agencies), 98 CORNELL L. REV. 769, 832 (2013). Beyond the legal
boundaries of permissible structural schemes, advocates for a single-director structure
often argue that it is a more efficient scheme. See Susan Block-Lieb, Accountability and
the Bureau of Consumer Financial Protection, 7 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 25, 36
(2012).
15. Datla & Revesz, supra note 14, at 769.
16. Id. at 831-32 (“The argument [that Congress cannot limit the President’s
authority over administrative agencies] is made by those who espouse the ‘unitary
executive’ theory, which holds that Article II ‘is a grant to the [P]resident of all of the
executive power, which includes the power to remove and direct all lower-level executive
officials.’ Instead, we accept that, within limits, Congress can by statute impose certain
constraints on the President’s exercise of his Article II powers. Our argument is simply
against fashioning a constitutional doctrine that would bootstrap onto a statutory
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an agency’s structure should be determined from historical and judicial
evaluation, as well as the agency’s specific function.17 From a legal
perspective, proponents of this regime express concern that a single
director may be able to usurp power granted to the President under Article
II.18 Fundamentally, the question of governance structure is about who
makes crucial decisions, and to whom the agency is accountable.19
This Note surveys the research and case law regarding agency
governance and applies it to the current controversy over the CFPB.
Importantly, this Note takes the position that the Supreme Court in Free
Enterprise Fund corrected a constitutionally impermissible structure but
did not offer guidance on which particular structures are constitutionally
impermissible, leaving juridical flexibility for Congress to implement its
desired protocol.20
This is a question of how Congress and the judiciary should
determine how to set the CFPB’s independence protections, and which
protections, if any, the agency needs in order to be effective. This Note
separates this debate into two ideological groups. The first approach,
which this Note terms the “legalist” approach, takes the position that the
agency’s statutory framework dictates what kinds of protections should
be implemented. The second approach, termed the “protectionist”
constraint a set of other constraints not specified in that statute.”) (quoting STEVEN G.
CALABRESI & CHRISTOPHER S. YOO, THE UNITARY EXECUTIVE: PRESIDENTIAL POWER
FROM WASHINGTON TO BUSH 341(2008)).
17. PHH I, 839 F.3d 1, 7 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (“The question before us is whether we
may extend the Supreme Court’s Humphrey’s Executor precedent to cover this novel,
single-director agency structure for an independent agency. To analyze that issue, we
follow the history-focused approach long applied by the Supreme Court in separation of
powers cases where, as here, the constitutional text alone does not resolve the matter.”
(citing Humphrey’s Ex’r v. United States, 295 U.S. 602 (1935))).
18. Id. at 16.
19. See Edith Ramirez, The FTC: A Framework for Promoting Competition and
Protecting Consumers, 83 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 2049, 2051–54 (2015) (describing the
Federal Trade Commission’s board structure as one of its central institutional strengths
in developing policy).
20. See Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477, 501
(2010) (“Neither respondents nor the dissent explains why the Board’s task, unlike so
many others, requires more than one layer of insulation from the President—or, for that
matter, why only two. The point is not to take issue with for-cause limitations in general;
we do not do that. The question here is far more modest. We deal with the unusual
situation, never before addressed by the Court, of two layers of for-cause tenure. And
though it may be criticized as elementary arithmetical logic[,] two layers are not the same
as one.”) (internal reference and quotations omitted).
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approach, argues that certain agency attributes, such as scope of authority
and historical practice, determine whether an agency requires a board
rather than a single director. Essentially, this Note frames the debate as a
disagreement on the source of guidance in determining agency structure.
This Note takes a third approach, adopting elements from both the
legalist and protectionist philosophies, ultimately advocating for the
notion that the CFPB should be governed by a board of directors.
Specifically, it argues that the D.C. Circuit’s initial holding in PHH
Corporation v. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau was correct in that
the Bureau’s single-director structure is unconstitutional due to the
director’s and the agency’s lack of accountability and vast regulatory
authority.21
Part I provides a brief background regarding the development of
administrative law jurisprudence since the early twentieth century,
focusing specifically on the governance and structure of financial
regulatory agencies. Part II summarizes the positions of the two
approaches discussed above, describing the rationale of both sides.
Finally, Part III argues that elements on both sides of this debate support
the conclusion that the CFPB’s single-director structure is
unconstitutional, and should instead be led by a board.
I. THE DEVELOPMENT OF FINANCIAL REGULATORY AGENCIES
A. THE EARLY CASES IN ADMINISTRATIVE LAW GOVERNANCE
It is important to lay out the Court’s jurisprudence on the two
fundamental issues at stake in the CFPB controversy, namely, for-cause
removal and board governance in financial regulatory agencies. Financial
matters in agency law have adopted a more nuanced regime since the
collapse of Enron, but issues of appointment and agency authority are
hardly a new phenomenon.22 The Supreme Court faced questions of
presidential appointments even before Congress enacted the
Administrative Procedure Act in 1946.23 In modern administrative law
21. See PHH I, 839 F.3d 1. This is distinguished from the en banc opinion that later
held that the CFPB’s structure was constitutional. See PHH II, 881 F.3d 75, 96 (D.C. Cir.
2018).
22. See generally Humphrey’s Ex’r, 295 U.S. at 602 (1935); Myers v. United States,
272 U.S. 52 (1926).
23. See Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 500, 596 (1946); Humphrey’s
Ex’r, 295 U.S. at 602; Myers, 272 U.S. at 52.
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parlance, several high-profile agencies are considered “independent
agencies.”24 In part, this designation means that the agency head may only
be removed “for cause,” as opposed to serving at the pleasure of the
President.25 In 1993, President Clinton issued Executive Order 12866,
exempting
statutorily-designated
“Independent
Regulatory
Commissions” (IRCs) from centralized review processes, thus
recognizing another sub-category of agencies.26 This development of
modern administrative law builds on a series of Supreme Court cases,
discussed below.
The first noteworthy case is Myers v. United States, in which the
Supreme Court held that the President had the ability under Article II to
unilaterally remove a postmaster.27 The Court held that Congress may
grant the power to the President alone to remove “inferior officers” of the
Executive Branch.28 Myers set a wide scope of presidential removal
authority, implying that the authority to appoint inferior officers was a de
facto authorization to remove them as well.29 In 1935, the Supreme Court
added some limits to Myers and held in Humphrey’s Executor that
Congress may restrict the President’s authority to remove agency heads—

24. See Marshall J. Breger & Gary J. Edles, Established by Practice: The Theory
and Operation of Independent Federal Agencies, 52 ADMIN. L. REV. 1111, 1138 (2000).
25. See id. (“The critical element of independence is the protection . . . against
removal except ‘for cause.’”); Lisa Schultz Bressman & Robert B. Thompson, The
Future of Agency Independence, 63 VAND. L. REV. 599, 610 (2010).
26. Exec. Order No. 12,866, 58 Fed. Reg. 51,735 (Sept. 30, 1993). Specifically, all
executive agencies are subject to rulemaking review by OIRA, except for those IRCs
designated as “independent regulatory agencies” by the Paperwork Reduction Act, 44
U.S.C. §§ 3501-3520 (2012). See also VIVIAN S. CHU & DANIEL T. SHEDD, CONG.
RESEARCH SERV., R42720, PRESIDENTIAL REVIEW OF INDEPENDENT REGULATORY
COMMISSION RULEMAKING: LEGAL ISSUES 3 (2012). There are also particular review
provisions and exemptions for financial regulatory agencies, specifically that they need
not submit legislative recommendations to any other agency before submitting to
Congress. Id. The CFPB is part of this protocol because it is part of the Federal Reserve,
which is an independent agency (for the purposes of this Note, the CFPB is referred to as
an “independent agency.”). Id. Other financial regulatory agencies that are part of this
regime include: Federal Reserve, FDIC, Comptroller of the Currency, the FHFA, and the
National Credit Union Administration. Id. at 4, n.35 (citing 12 U.S.C § 250).
27. 272 U.S. at 163–64.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 161 (“The power to remove inferior executive officers, like that to remove
superior executive officers, is an incident of the power to appoint them, and is in its nature
an executive power.”).
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specifically, a Commissioner of the Federal Trade Commission (FTC).30
Humphrey’s Executor set the precedent for “for cause” removal as applied
to heads of independent agencies.31 Under a “for cause” removal regime,
the President may only remove a respective inferior officer for
“inefficiency, neglect of duty, or malfeasance in office.”32
The decision in Humphrey’s Executor drew largely on the explicit
actions Congress took to limit the President’s ability to remove members
of the FTC.33 A lack of explicit instruction was central to the next case in
this discussion, Wiener v. United States.34 In Wiener, the Court sought to
fill a gap left by Myers and Humphrey’s Executor.35 Specifically, the
Court addressed how difficult it is to interpret whether or not an agency
head can only be removed for cause when there is no clear statutory
directive on the matter.36 The Court took a substantially different
approach from the previous cases, holding that this determination should
be made by looking to the agency’s “nature and function” as intended by
Congress.37 This is much closer to an endorsement of a legislative-intentbased approach, rather than simply analyzing the relevant agency or its

30. Humphrey’s Ex’r v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 619, 632 (1935) (upholding a
statutory provision stating that the President could only remove commissioners of the
FTC “for cause”). The Court distinguished this case from Myers on the basis that the job
of postmaster was too unlike the matter in Humphrey’s Executor to apply. See
Humphrey’s Ex’r, 295 U.S. at 627; see also Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 687 (1988).
31. See Morrison, 487 U.S. at 687; Wiener v. United States, 357 U.S. 349, 352
(1958) (describing Humphrey’s Executor as limiting Myers to “purely executive
officers”) (quoting Humphrey’s Ex’r, 295 U.S. at 628).
32. Morrison, 487 U.S. at 604, 632 (internal quotation omitted).
33. See Humphrey’s Ex’r, 295 U.S. at 626–27 (“Thus, the language of the act, the
legislative reports, and the general purposes of the legislation as reflected by the debates,
all combine to demonstrate the congressional intent to create a body of experts who shall
gain experience by length of service; a body which shall be independent of executive
authority, except in its selection, and free to exercise its judgment without the leave or
hindrance of any other official or any department of the government.”).
34. 357 U.S. at 352–53.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 353–54 (“Thus, the most reliable factor for drawing an inference regarding
the President’s power of removal in our case is the nature of the function that Congress
vested in the War Claims Commission. What were the duties that Congress confided to
this Commission? And can the inference fairly be drawn from the failure of Congress to
provide for removal that these Commissioners were to remain in office at the will of the
President? For such is the assertion of power on which petitioner’s removal must rest.”).

2018]

THE CFPB: A NOVEL AGENCY
DESIGN WITH FAMILIAR ISSUES

161

statutory governance.38 Wiener, therefore, represents a standard that
provides more deference to courts on questions of agency authority.39
B. THE MODERN CASES: FREE ENTERPRISE FUND AND THE PHH CASES
The modern wave of administrative law jurisprudence in financial
regulatory agencies came as a result of two major national events in the
financial services industry, as discussed above: the collapse of Enron in
2002 and the global recession in 2008.40 Both of these events resulted in
new, sweeping legislation that had a significant impact on the regulatory
state in the financial services sector. Following the Enron collapse,
Congress enacted the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX), targeted at reforming
practices at the “Big Five” accounting firms.41 Perhaps most importantly,
SOX created the PCAOB, a new entity within the Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC) specifically tasked with overseeing the
major accounting firms.42 Similarly, Congress enacted the Dodd-Frank
Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank)
following the 2008 financial crisis.43 Dodd-Frank created the CFPB, a
powerful new agency tasked with regulating a wide range of business
functions, specifically student loans, credit card companies, and retail
banking.44
Shortly after creating these entities, specific legal questions arose
regarding their accountability to the political branches and their amount
of unilateral authority. The PCAOB was controversial in that it had a

38.
39.

Id.
Id. The Supreme Court’s highly publicized decision in Morrison v. Olson is also
frequently mentioned with this line of cases, as the decision concerned the President’s
ability to remove inferior officers under Article II. See Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654
(1988). However, in comparison to the case law mentioned in this Note, Morrison did
not focus as narrowly on regulatory agencies. Id. Therefore, it is not discussed at length
in this Note.
40. See supra Introduction.
41. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107–204, 116 Stat. 745 (2002).
Presently, the major accounting firms are known as the “Big Four,” due to the eventual
demise of Arthur Andersen, discussed infra Part III.
42. Id.
43. Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111–
203, 124 Stat. 1376–2223 (2010).
44. Id.
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“two-layer removal-protection” scheme for PCAOB members.45 That is,
SEC commissioners were the only authorities allowed to fire PCAOB
members, and they could only do so “for cause.”46 The President is
permitted to remove SEC Commissioners, but may only do so for cause.47
This left the President with little to no ability to remove the PCAOB
members.48 The CFPB was also controversial given its single-director
governing structure and its alleged lack of accountability to the political
branches.49
The Supreme Court addressed the PCAOB’s structural issues in Free
Enterprise Fund v. Public Company Accounting Oversight Board,
holding that the “dual for cause limitation[s] on the removal of [PCAOB]
members” violated separation of powers.50 The Free Enterprise Fund
court made an effort to balance the holdings from Myers and Humphrey’s
Executor, which lie on opposite ends of a spectrum of executive
authority.51 As discussed above, Myers held that the President generally
45. See 15 U.S.C.A. § 7217(d)(3) (West 2010) (held unconstitutional in Free Enter.
Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477, 477–78 (2010)):
The Commission may . . . remove from office or censure any person who is, or at the
time of the alleged misconduct was, a member of the Board, if the Commission finds,
on the record, after notice and opportunity for a hearing, that such member(A) has willfully violated any provision of this Act, the rules of the Board, or the
securities laws;
(B) has willfully abused the authority of that member; or
(C) without reasonable justification or excuse, has failed to enforce compliance with
any such provision or rule, or any professional standard by any registered public
accounting firm or any associated person thereof.
46. See Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477, 478

(2010) (citing 15 U.S.C. §§ 7211(e)(6), 7217(d)(3)) (“The parties . . . agree that the
Commissioners, in turn, cannot themselves be removed by the President except for
‘inefficiency, neglect of duty, or malfeasance in office.’”) (citation omitted) (quoting
Humphrey’s Ex’r v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 620 (1935)).
47. Id. at 525.
48. Id. at 478.
49. See generally PHH II, 881 F.3d 75 (D.C. Cir. 2018) (en banc); PHH I, 839 F.3d
1 (D.C. Cir. 2016).
50. 561 U.S. 477, 478 (2010) (citing Humphrey’s Ex’r, 295 U.S. at 620). Under its
initial structure, PCAOB members could only be removed “for cause” by SEC
Commissioners. The President can only remove SEC Commissioners “for cause,” thus
creating a two-tier structure that insulated PCAOB members from removal by the
President. The holding in Free Enterprise Fund pertains to provisions of the SarbanesOxley Act which created the PCAOB following the collapse of Enron and the subsequent
collapse of Arthur Andersen. See id.
51. See supra Part I.A. See generally Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52 (1926).
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has authority to remove “inferior officers,” representing a greater amount
of unilateral authority under Article II.52 In Humphrey’s Executor, the
Court limited the application of Myers by holding that Congress may
restrict the President’s authority to remove the heads of certain
agencies—specifically, the President may only do so “for cause.”53 The
implication here is that the President’s ability to remove officers of the
executive branch is not universal, and that Congress may impose some
limitations on the President’s ability to do so.54
In Free Enterprise Fund, the Court found that the PCAOB’s duallayer structure, combined with for-cause removal restrictions, violated the
separation of powers doctrine.55 The Court held that each case upholding
limits on presidential removal authority involved only one level of
“protected tenure” between the President and the individual exercising
executive authority.56 In each of the earlier cases discussed above, either
the President or a subordinate who could be removed at will decided
whether good cause existed for removal.57 The Court distinguished this
regime from the PCAOB’s dual-layer structure, opining that it did not
afford the President “any decision on whether that good cause exists [for
removal].”58
In PHH Corporation v. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, the
D.C. Circuit initially held that the CFPB’s structure was
unconstitutional.59 As initially proposed, the CFPB was to be led by a

52.
53.

See Myers, 272 U.S. at 163–64.
See Humphrey’s Ex’r, 295 U.S. at 629 (“We think it plain under the Constitution
that illimitable power of removal is not possessed by the President in respect of officers
of the character of those just named. The authority of Congress, in creating quasi
legislative or quasi judicial agencies, to require them to act in discharge of their duties
independently of executive control cannot well be doubted; and that authority includes,
as an appropriate incident, power to fix the period during which they shall continue, and
to forbid their removal except for cause in the meantime. For it is quite evident that one
who holds his office only during the pleasure of another cannot be depended upon to
maintain an attitude of independence against the latter’s will.”).
54. Id.
55. See Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477, 492
(2010).
56. Id. at 495. The Free Enterprise Fund decision was based largely on the early
administrative appointment cases discussed above. See id.
57. Id.
58. Id. (emphasis added).
59. See generally PHH I, 839 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 2016).
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single director, rather than a board.60 The initial PHH decision was
eventually vacated in an en banc opinion, thereby holding that the CFPB’s
structure was constitutional.61 Lack of executive and congressional
oversight were issues in both PHH cases.62 The court in PHH I declared
that the Director of the CFPB was effectively “the single most powerful
official in the entire United States Government.”63 In the opinion, thenJudge Brett Kavanaugh specifically alluded to a lack of checks placed on
the director by any particular deliberative body, both from a policy
determination perspective and from a removal perspective.64
The PHH I court also found the lack of historical support for the
CFPB’s governance structure particularly troubling.65 The court recalled
the historical origins of independent agencies, noting that independent
agencies are an exception to the general rule under Article II that the
President has authority to “supervise, direct, and remove at will
subordinate officers in the Executive Branch.”66 What makes these
agencies independent is that they exercise “executive power,” have heads
that are removable only for cause, and are not supervised directly by the
President.67 This vast amount of agency authority has traditionally been
mitigated by establishing a board governance structure for independent
agencies.68 The court found that the CFPB represented an unprecedented
deviation from this historical construct.69
The PHH II court disagreed with this analysis and based its holding
largely on Wiener, opining that the linchpin in the constitutionality of a
removal protocol was not history, but rather, “the nature of the function
that Congress vested in the agency.”70 This represents a more “functional”
60. 12 U.S.C. §§ 5491(b)(1), (2)(stating that authority to lead the agency would be
vested in the hands of a single director).
61. See generally PHH II, 881 F.3d 75 (D.C. Cir. 2018) (en banc).
62. See, e.g., PHH I, 839 F.3d at 26, 34.
63. Id. at 16.
64. Id. at 16-18.
65. Id. at 18.
66. See id. at 5 (citing Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52 (1926)).
67. Id. at 5–6. Specifically, the “executive power” bestowed upon independent
agencies is the ability to bring enforcement actions against members of the public, and
rule-making authority that is binding on the subjects of regulation, thereby carrying out
statutes passed by Congress. Id.
68. Id. at 6.
69. Id.; see also Block-Lieb, supra note 14, at 26.
70. See PHH II, 881 F.3d 75, 86 (D.C. Cir. 2018) (en banc) (quoting Wiener v U.S.,
357 U.S. 349, 353 (1958).
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analysis of what the needs are to protect certain agencies.71 The PHH II
court rejected the panel opinion’s view that Free Enterprise Fund had
granted the President greater authority than had the earlier decisions.72
According to the en banc opinion, the CFPB’s structure does, in fact, have
historical justification,73 and its mandate of authority was sufficiently
limited to justify a single director in the face of historical precedent.74
II. PROTECTING AGENCIES FROM CAPTURE
A. GENERAL CAPTURE PROTECTIONS
The central question in the CFPB controversy can be applied to many
other government agencies, especially those charged with regulating the
financial services industry. Since the inception of the CFPB, a debate has
emerged on this issue, with some scholars arguing that agencies can be
led by a single director, and others arguing the opposite.75 Free Enterprise
Fund offered no direction on this matter.76 While the court in Free
Enterprise Fund struck down the PCAOB’s unique structure, the opinion
did not express a particular view on the general concept of for-cause
removal.77 In other words, the Court offered no guidance on when, if ever,
an agency head’s position requires for-cause removal.78 To understand
how this should apply at the CFPB, it is important to see how Congress
has handled this decision in the past.
Generally, “independent agencies” are designated in part by the
classic protections of for-cause removal and a multi-member board
structure.79 Consistent with the precedential authority discussed here,
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.

Id.
Id. at 90.
Id. at 91.
Id. at 101-02.
See Block-Lieb, supra note 14, at 25-26.
See Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477, 492

(2010).
77. Id.
78. Id. (emphasis added).
79. See Barkow, supra note 2, at 16 (“According to the existing legal literature and
case law, the defining hallmark of an independent agency is that it is headed by someone
who cannot be removed at will by the President but instead can be removed only for good
cause.”). See also CHU & SHEDD, supra note 26 (discussing the “independent” aspects of
independent agencies, specifically how and why they are granted a greater degree of
unilateral authority).
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these protections, as applied to the CFPB, will be the focus of this Note’s
analysis. Agency designers implement these protections in the hope that
they will insulate the agency from external control by special interests and
internal bureaucratic agendas.80 The central premise is that board structure
is more deliberative, and for-cause removal places a check on the
President’s political ambitions.81 The two protections tend to appear
together in agencies, though for-cause removal has a far more extensive
judicial history.82 This gives both Congress and the courts substantial
guidance on how to approach issues of for-cause removal. Presidential
appointment and removal power has a clear foundation in the
Constitution, while agency governance design is a more modern legal
concept.83
The President’s ability to appoint and remove inferior officers was
surely a matter for the courts long before the administrative state.84 The
nuances of agencies merely added new considerations for the federal
judiciary to evaluate in deciding whether or not the President had acted
within his Article II authority. The governance structure issue is
inherently different from the appointment issue, as it has no textual
foundation in the Constitution.85 This was particularly clear in PHH I,
80.
81.
82.

See CHU & SHEDD, supra note 26.
Id.
See Barkow, supra note 2. As discussed, the Court has decided several cases
upholding for-cause removal protection specifically applied to certain agencies. The
Supreme Court has not decided a case in which the sole issue was the structure of the
agency’s governing regime. Compare Humphrey’s Ex’r v. United States, 295 U.S. 602
(1935), and Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 687 (1988) (both concerning for-cause
removal), with PHH II, 881 F.3d 75, 86 (D.C. Cir. 2018) (en banc), and PHH I, 839 F.3d
1 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (neither of which are Supreme Court cases). While the D.C. Circuit
decided issues of for-cause removal and structure in PHH I and PHH II, the key
distinction discussed here was that the Court was largely focused on whether the structure
of the CFPB amounted to a constitutional violation. The Supreme Court’s constitutional
analysis has been limited to determining whether the specific for-cause removal protocols
were constitutional. See Free Enter. Fund, 561 U.S. at 492; Humphrey’s Ex’r, 295 U.S.
at 602; Morrison, 487 U.S. at 687.
83. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2.
84. See, e.g., Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 155 (1803) (“The 2d section of the
2d article of the constitution, declares, that, ‘the President shall nominate, and, by and
with the advice and consent of the senate, shall appoint ambassadors, other public
ministers and consuls, and all other officers of the United States, whose appointments are
not otherwise provided for.’”) (quoting U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2); Myers v. United States,
272 U.S. 52, 158 (1926).
85. See Datla & Revesz, supra note 14, at 769, 832.

2018]

THE CFPB: A NOVEL AGENCY
DESIGN WITH FAMILIAR ISSUES

167

where the D.C. Circuit focused its analysis primarily on judicial history,
rather than undertaking a new whole-cloth constitutional analysis.86
While for-cause removal was not the sole issue in either PHH matter,
the legal doctrine surrounding the issue has important implications for the
CFPB. When legislators create independent agencies, they are often more
concerned with “agency capture” than with political manipulation.87 The
court indicated this sentiment in PHH II, alluding to the particular
importance of independence in financial regulatory agencies.88 In
discussing Free Enterprise Fund, Professor Rachel Barkow argues that
the focus on for-cause removal is an improper “obsessive focus” because
agency designers are rarely motivated by a concern for presidential
insulation when creating an independent agency.89 Barkow argues that the
concerns regarding external capture far outweigh concerns of political
manipulation from within the federal government.90 In her view, focusing
on political manipulation distracts policymakers from more important
capture concerns.91 Thus, Barkow believes that the traditional hallmarks
of agency independence should not be those that protect agencies from
the President, but those that shield them from both political forces and
external special interests.92
This debate shows that the question of the CFPB’s structure
implicates separation of power questions in addition to important policy
questions. An understanding of the most effective measures to protect
agencies is a policy question that is best suited for Congress. Regardless
of whether the courts ever require a set of agency protections, agency
designers will always be concerned with some independence measures.93
86.
87.

See PHH I, 839 F.3d at 7–8.
See Barkow, supra note 2, at 17; see also Todd Zywicki, The Consumer
Financial Protection Bureau: Savior or Menace?, 81 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 856, 884-85
(2013). In this context, “agency capture” refers to control by special interests, rather than
control by political actors such as the President and Congress.
88. See PHH II, 881 F.3d 75, 94 (D.C. Cir. 2018) (en banc) (“Indeed, the
independence of financial regulators is so well established by tradition and precedent that
courts have assumed these agencies’ heads have removal protection even in the absence
of clear statutory text so directing.”) (internal citation omitted).
89. See Barkow, supra note 2, at 17.
90. See id.
91. See id.
92. See id. at 26-42 (describing the “traditional lodestars” of independent agencies).
Barkow further argues that the better indicators of independence are the presence of
“equalizing insulators” between these two forces. Id. at 42.
93. See id. at 26-42.
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The related question is one for the judiciary, namely, which agency
independence protections are permitted within the scope of Article II.
B. CFPB CAPTURE CONCERNS: FUNDING AND ACCOUNTABILITY
The agency capture concerns related to appointment powers are
mainly an issue for the executive branch. Congress, however, also plays
a central role in the administrative state.94 The constitutional status of
independent and executive agencies is inherently nebulous, with some
scholars referring to agencies as the “fourth branch.”95 This lack of
constitutional guidance complicates separation of power questions.96 One
crucial independence aspect that is particularly pertinent to the CFPB is
how agencies are funded.97
Congress has granted a small number of agencies the ability to “selffund” to avoid political influence by Congress.98 The CFPB is one such
entity, as is the PCAOB.99 Self-funding schemes are perhaps most
common in agencies focused on bank regulation.100 Charles Kruly makes
the bold argument that self-funded agencies are “the purest form of
independence in the federal government.”101
The CFPB’s funding scheme is particularly revolutionary in two
ways: 1) the agency’s budget is essentially guaranteed, and 2) unlike other
independent agencies, the CFPB does not have to go through an annual
appropriations process.102 This regime certainly removes some
94. Yoon-Ho Alex Lee, Beyond Agency Core Mission, 68 ADMIN. L. REV. 551, 551
(2016).
95. See PHH I, 839 F.3d 1, 6 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (“The independent agencies
collectively constitute, in effect, a headless fourth branch of the U.S. Government”); see
also William N. Eskridge, Jr., America’s Statutory “Constitution”, 41 U.C. DAVIS L.
REV. 1, 11 (2007) (“Scholars heatedly disagree as to whether such [independent] agencies
and such lawmaking or adjudicatory authority are un-Constitutional.”).
96. See NLRB v. Noel Canning, 134 S. Ct. 2550, 2560 (2014).
97. See Charles Kruly, Self-Funding and Agency Independence, 81 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 1733, 1734–35 (2013).
98. “Self-funding” refers to exemption from the traditional congressional
appropriations process, allowing the agency to seek its own funds. Id. at 1735–36.
99. Id.
100. See id. at 1737.
101. Id. at 1738.
102. See Block-Lieb, supra note 14, at 26 (citing Harv. L. Rev. Ass’n, Note,
Independence, Congressional Weakness, and the Importance of Appointment: The
Impact of Combining Budgetary Autonomy with Removal Protection, 125 HARV. L. REV.
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congressional influence over the agency, as Congress effectively shares
some of its own authority (the spending power) and grants it to the
agency.103 Kruly further argues that these agencies almost always exhibit
the traditional forms of executive independence, making them free of both
political branches.104
Nothing specifically suggests that the CFPB or any other agency, to
secure self-funding, must have executive protections such as multimember boards and for-cause removal.105 The assertion is only that this
tends to be the nature of these agencies from a practical perspective.106 In
other words, a normative analysis of self-funding agencies indicates that
these agencies tend to have the classic features of independent agencies,
at least in theory.107 Even the funding determination, something vital to
every agency’s ability to operate, does not appear to carry with it any
structural mandate regarding governance.
A common criticism of self-funding is that it effectively makes the
agency accountable to nobody, as acknowledged by Kruly.108 The
counterargument to this view is that funding alone is not the linchpin in
determining agency accountability.109 Advocates of the self-funding
protocol point to the CFPB’s substantive activities, and argue that the
diffuse statutory protections that the agency enforces make it de facto
accountable to several other regulatory institutions.110

1822, 1823 (2012)). The CFPB is also exempt from OIRA review, but that is a feature
common to other independent agencies. See Zywicki supra, note 87, at 891–92.
103. See Kruly, supra note 97, at 1736.
104. See id. at 1738.
105. See id.
106. See id.
107. See id.
108. See id.
109. See Block-Lieb, supra note 14, at 28 (“By statutory design, the CFPB shares its
regulatory space with numerous political actors. Because it is indirectly accountable to a
wide range of both political and industry interests, the CFPB is less likely to promulgate
overreaching regulations that protect consumer interests to the detriment of all else.”)
(citation omitted); see also Keith S. Brown & Adam Candeub, Partisans & Partisan
Commissions, 17 GEO. MASON L. REV. 789, 809 (2010) (arguing that independent
agencies become dominated by congressional agendas rather than the demands of the
President).
110. See Block-Lieb, supra note 14, at 27.

170

FORDHAM JOURNAL
OF CORPORATE & FINANCIAL LAW

[Vol. XXIV

CFPB critics and supporters both agree that the CFPB is unusually
immune from direct congressional oversight.111 The disagreement
between proponents and opponents of the CFPB’s funding scheme is
mainly whether this lack of accountability is a dangerous force or a
positive one.112 CFPB proponents see the self-funding as an insulator from
Congress and, by extension, from special interests.113 Opponents of the
CFPB (or at least its structure) see an excessive delegation of authority
that is not clearly accountable to any one branch of government.114 This
dispute over funding highlights the disagreement over the very existence
of the CFPB in the first place. Both camps realize that the CFPB and
Dodd-Frank emerged as a response to the 2008 global recession.115
Proponents of the organization see a response to a global conflict, while
opponents see an unprecedented level of unchecked authority by a federal
agency.116

111. Compare Block-Lieb, supra note 14, at 27, and Kruly, supra note 97, with
Zywicki, supra note 87, at 888 (“Thus, not only are the more obvious formal controls
(removal by the President and appropriations by Congress) absent from the CFPB, many
of the informal controls typically seen in other agencies are absent as well.”) (citation
omitted), and William Simpson, Note, Above Reproach: How the Consumer Financial
Protection Bureau Escapes Constitutional Checks & Balances, 36 REV. BANKING & FIN.
L. 343, 371–72 (2016) (“Dodd-Frank’s framework is far more egregious than simple
unauthorized spending the law expressly prohibits Congress from ever reviewing the
CFPB budget”) (citation omitted) (citing 12 U.S.C. § 5497(a)(1) (2012)).
112. See Simpson, supra note 111, at 351; see also Block-Lieb, supra note 14, at 27.
113. See Kruly, supra note 97, at 1736.
114. See Simpson, supra note 111, at 351.
115. See Block-Lieb, supra note 14 (“The Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission found
that regulators were aware of the marketing and mass distribution of subprime mortgages
and, due to industry pressure and ideological myopia, determined to do nothing. Congress
sought to prevent the possibility of further influence of this sort with the enactment of
[Dodd-Frank]”) (citations omitted); see also Simpson, supra note 111, at 357 (arguing
that the federal government exploited the financial crisis to create a new agency with a
wide scope of authority) (“In the eyes of its critics . . . Dodd-Frank represented a sweeping
new open-ended power grant to the administrative state, erecting new barriers to credit
access, drying up liquidity, and driving local community banks out of business with
burdensome compliance costs.”). See id.
116. See Block-Lieb, supra note 14, at 27-28; see also Simpson, supra note 111, at
353.
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C. THE LEGALIST AND PROTECTIONIST APPROACHES
This Note refers to the first approach to determine which capture
protections should be implemented as the “legalist” approach. The legalist
approach focuses less on policy merits and more on constitutional and
statutory limitations.117 Legalists place a greater emphasis on the
governing precedent and statutory directives than on a preferred regime
of capture protections.118 This, however, does not imply that legalists
necessarily come down on one side of this debate of whether the CFPB
needs a board structure and if the director should be removable at will.
Rather, legalists believe that a chosen capture protection regime must
comply with the relevant statutory and judicial guidelines.119 They also
believe that there is no justification to “read in” any other implied form
of protection.120 Legalists generally draw guidance from the agency’s
statutory framework and from Supreme Court jurisprudence on similar
matters.121 In other words, legalist scholars seem to believe that the CFPB
must fit a mold of agency protections endorsed by the Supreme Court and
provided for by statute.122
As discussed, the Supreme Court has been able to point to specific
constitutional provisions on for-cause removal questions, while making
more ad hoc decisions on the governance structure aspect.123 As a result,
the Court has a much richer precedential body on removal matters than
on agency governance.124 The Supreme Court in Free Enterprise Fund set

117. See, e.g., Datla & Revesz, supra note 14, at 773–74 (“[T]here is no reason why
any given statutory limitation, or set of limitations, on presidential power should generate
additional limitations not provided for by statute.”).
118. Id.
119. See id. (“[B]ecause no one feature of independence perfectly correlates with
another, there is no reason why any given statutory limitation, or set of limitations, on
presidential power should generate additional limitations not provided for by statute.”)
(citations omitted) (citing Geoffrey P. Miller, Independent Agencies, 1986 SUP. CT. REV.
41, 52 n.49 (1986)).
120. See id.
121. See, e.g., id. at 773-74 (arguing that the only capture protections permitted are
those that are mentioned directly by statute).
122. Id.
123. See supra Part I.
124. As discussed, the Supreme Court has decided several cases upholding for-cause
removal protection specifically applied to certain agencies. See Barkow, supra note 2 and
accompanying text for a discussion on the courts’ constitutional analyses in the pertinent
cases.

172

FORDHAM JOURNAL
OF CORPORATE & FINANCIAL LAW

[Vol. XXIV

a limit on Congress’ ability to protect agencies from presidential actions,
but never endorsed a “minimum standard” of removal protections.125 In
other words, the Court set a “ceiling” on congressional authority to restrict
the President, but never mentioned the relevant “floor.”126 In fact, the
Court never actually referenced any benchmark of required protections.127
Rather, the Court simply found that the PCAOB’s structure did not pass
a narrow analysis of permissible congressional restriction on the
President.128 The lack of clear judicial determination on the governance
matter suggests that the PHH cases are revolutionary in that they
challenged the constitutionality of the CFPB primarily based on
grievances related to governance, rather than a combination of both
governance and removal powers.129
125. See generally Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 561 U.S.
477, 477 (2010). The Supreme Court struck down the particular administrative scheme
as usurping the President’s Article II powers but did not indicate that there was any
particular minimum insulation required for independent agencies. Id.
126. Id.
127. See id. at 501 (“The point is not to take issue with for-cause limitations in
general; we do not do that. The question here is far more modest. We deal with the
unusual situation, never before addressed by the Court, of two layers of for-cause
tenure.”).
128. Id.
129. A crucial distinction between the petitioners’ claims in Free Enterprise Fund
and in the PHH cases is that the Free Enterprise Fund petitioners challenged the
constitutionality of the PCAOB primarily on the President’s ability to remove members
of the board, while the challenge to the PCAOB’s structure was ancillary to the removal
matter. See Free Enter. Fund, 561 U.S. at 509 (“As the judgment in this case
demonstrates, restricting certain officers to a single level of insulation from the President
affects the conditions under which those officers might someday be removed, and would
have no effect, absent a congressional determination to the contrary, on the validity of
any officer’s continuance in office. The only issue in this case is whether Congress may
deprive the President of adequate control over the Board, which is the regulator of first
resort and the primary law enforcement authority for a vital sector of our economy. We
hold that it cannot”). The PHH petitioners premised their claim primarily on the
governance structure of the CFPB, showing a departure from related administrative law
jurisprudence. See PHH II, 881 F.3d 75, 96 (2018) (en banc) (“[T]he constitutionality of
for-cause removal turn[ing] on . . . whether [the agency] is led by an individual or group
. . . finds no home in constitutional law”); see also Opening Brief for Petitioners at 45–
46, PHH I, 839 F.3d 1 (2016) (No. 15-1177) (“[T]he CFPB’s unconstitutionality lies in
its unprecedented level of insulation from all democratic checks and accountability. Thus,
perhaps the most telling indication of the severe constitutional problem with the CFPB’s
structure is the lack of historical precedent for this entity.”) (internal quotations omitted)
(quoting Free Enter. Fund, 561 U.S. at 505). While the PHH petitioners also raised
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The legalist view has support in areas of administrative law other
than the cases mentioned above. One important source of support comes
from the debate over the President’s ability to control internal agency
decisions.130 There is often some temptation to conflate presidential
control over agencies with authority to make internal decisions entrusted
to the agency head.131 This is typically called “directive” authority.132
While there is some speculation on the limits of directive authority, the
generally accepted view is that the President does not have directive
authority over decisions that are “entrusted by statute to agency heads.”133
Relying on the constitutional limits on the President leaves legalists with
an argument that the CFPB as an independent agency is inherently
insulated from presidential capture.134 The judicial clarity on removal
authority, taken in conjunction with the lack of clarity on governance,
gives legalist scholars a strong argument for removal protections, but little

concerns about the President’s inability to remove the Director of the CFPB, the main
thrust of their argument was that the CFPB’s structure was unprecedented and, thus,
unconstitutional due to the inordinate amount of authority given to the Director. See
Opening Brief for Petitioners at 47–48, PHH I, 839 F.3d 1 (2016) (No. 15-1177).
130. See generally Robert V. Percival, Who’s In Charge? Does the President Have
Directive Authority over Regulatory Decisions?, 79 FORDHAM L. REV. 2488, 2509
(2011).
131. Id.
132. Id. at 2540.
133. Id. See also Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Saving the Unitary Executive Theory from
Those Who Would Distort and Abuse It: A Review of the Unitary Executive by Steven G.
Calabresi and Christopher S. Yoo, 12 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 593, 596 (2010) (“I believe
instead that, when Congress has lawfully vested decision-making power in an executive
branch officer, . . . that executive branch officer is the only person who can make the
decision.”); Peter L. Strauss, Overseer, or “The Decider”? The President in
Administrative Law, 75 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 696, 759 (2007) (“If its text chooses between
President as overseer of the resulting assemblage, and President as necessarily entitled
‘decider,’ the implicit message is that of oversight, not decision.”).
134. See CHU & SHEDD, supra note 26; Zywicki supra note 87, at 890. Much of the
directive authority debate centers on the president’s control over non-independent
agencies. See Percival, supra note 130. There is also a countervailing view within the
legalist school of thought that suggests the President’s constitutional authority includes
the ability to remove all “principal officers” at will, and that limits on this authority are
unconstitutional, regardless of the “independent agency” designation. See Neomi Rao,
Removal: Necessary and Sufficient for Presidential Control, 65 ALA. L. REV. 1205, 1244
(2014) (“It follows from the necessity of the removal power that the President must be
able to remove at will all principal officers.”).
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guidance on the governance matter.135 As applied to the CFPB, legalist
scholars have support for instituting for-cause removal, but the
governance question remains less clear, as held by the PHH II court.136
This Note refers to the next group of scholars who have expressed a
view on the CFPB as “protectionists.” Protectionists favor a policycentric approach rather than a purely judicial one.137 They believe strong
capture protections are necessary for administrative agencies, seeing
potential agency for capture as an unacceptable risk.138 In addition, they
believe that the jurisprudential nexus surrounding administrative agency
governance allows for a wide range of capture protections.139 The
dissenting opinion in Free Enterprise Fund is illustrative of the
protectionist position.140 Rather than undertaking an analysis limited to
the bounds of presidential and agency authority, Justice Breyer opted to
focus on the applicability and practicality of the majority’s opinion,
criticizing it as unrealistic and difficult to apply.141
There are some capture-prevention measures beyond for-cause
removal protection and multi-member boards that are considered indicia
of agency independence.142 For-cause removal, however, seems to have a
more hallowed place in administrative law jurisprudence than other
protections.143 The Supreme Court has even deduced an implied for-cause
135. See PHH II, 881 F.3d 75, 86 (2018) (en banc) (quoting Wiener v. United States,
357 U.S. 349, 352–55(1958)).
136. Id.
137. See, e.g., Jonathan H. Adler, Anti-Disruption Statutory Construction, 38
CARDOZO L. REV. 509, 525–26 (2013) (describing Chief Justice Roberts’ majority
opinion in Free Enterprise Fund as a “surgical strike,” in accordance with a
“minimal[ist]” approach to statutory interpretation that avoided larger constitutional
issues relevant to the case); Hans Bader, Free Enterprise Fund v. PCAOB: Narrow
Separation-of-Powers Ruling Illustrates That the Supreme Court Is Not “Pro-Business”,
2010 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 269, 284 (2010) (arguing that the Court in Free Enterprise
Fund should have gone further by striking down Sarbanes-Oxley in its entirety).
138. See, e.g., NLRB v. Noel Canning, 134 S. Ct. 2550, 2567 (2014); Wiener, 357
U.S. at 353–54; Fed. Election Comm’n v. NRA Political Victory Fund, 6 F.3d 821, 826
(D.C. Cir. 1993).
139. See Wiener, 357 U.S. at 353–54.
140. See Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477, 537
(2010) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (describing the majority’s opinion as a “mechanical” rule,
“divorced from the context of the case at hand.”).
141. Id.
142. See Datla and Revesz, supra note 14.
143. See Wiener, 357 U.S. at 354 (holding that Congress did not intend for the
President to have at-will removal power under the War Claims Act).
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removal protection in several independent agencies, despite lack of clear
statutory instructions.144 This may be one of the strongest arguments in
support of the protectionist position. The main justification for an implied
for-cause removal restriction is that congressional use of some
independence measures is evidence of intent to implement other similar
measures.145 Implied protection indicates that the idea of capture
protection is an inherent component of all agencies, regardless of
individual agency design decisions.146 The implication seems to be that
capture protection is a necessary, rather than a sufficient, feature of
independent agencies.147 Adopting the idea of implied protection leaves
little argument over whether there should be for-cause removal or not, as
it is considered implicit in independent agencies.148
Nevertheless, the concept of implied protections has been sharply
criticized.149 Kirti Datla and Richard Revesz are among those who reject
the idea.150 They argue that the case law endorsing this doctrine “[is] not
grounded in statutory text, historical context, or a tenable theory of
congressional intent.”151 This demonstrates a strong legalist
counterargument to a protectionist concept by adhering to the relevant
statutory text.152 Applying Datla and Revesz’s approach to the CFPB

144. See id.; Datla and Revesz, supra note 14, at 833 (citing SEC v. Blinder, Robinson
& Co., Inc., 855 F.2d 677, 681 (10th Cir. 1988) and Fed. Election Comm’n v. NRA
Political Victory Fund, 6 F.3d 821, 826 (D.C. Cir. 1993)).
145. Datla and Revesz acknowledge that there is effectively one “exception” to their
claim. This exception is that for cause removal is “always accompanied by a set term of
tenure.” See Datla and Revesz, supra note 14, at 833. However, they claim that, “the
relationship does not hold in the opposite direction. A set term of tenure does not always
correspond to for-cause removal protection.” Id.
146. See Wiener, 357 U.S. at 354.
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. See Datla & Revesz, supra note 14, at 833.
150. See id. (arguing that the cases supporting implied protections, including SEC v.
Blinder, Robinson & Co. and Federal Election Commission v. NRA Political Victory
Fund, were “incorrectly decided because their central premise—that the presence of
certain features of independence is evidence of congressional intent to endow an agency
with other features of independence—is wrong.”).
151. See id. at 835.
152. The parties in Free Enterprise Fund both assumed that SEC Commissioners
could only be removed “for cause.” See Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting
Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477, 487 (2010). The Court in Free Enterprise Fund agreed to
decide the case “with that understanding.” Id. See also Datla and Revesz, supra note 14,
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matter, or any other independent agency, is fairly one-dimensional, and
strikes at the heart of the legalist view. Datla and Revesz eschew openended judicial nuances and rely on the relevant statutes alone.153 The only
analysis required is looking at the statutory text.154 This leaves the policy
decision in Congress’ hands, while the courts’ mission is only to interpret
the statute.155
The CFPB naturally presents its own set of independence and capture
issues. These have been noticed by both legalists and protectionists.
Professor Todd Zywicki argues that the CFPB is particularly prone to
agency capture due to its single-industry focus and a perceived lack of
accountability.156 The “single-mission” that Zywicki refers to is the
CFPB’s mandate to regulate a narrow segment of banking activity.157 The
concern here is that the largest financial institutions will be able to
manage the unprecedented amount of regulatory work initiated by the
CFPB.158 Larger banks will, in turn, be able to lobby the agency more
effectively than smaller banks, and will be able to curry favor within the
agency.159 Zywicki’s theory finds some support in Barkow’s research,
which takes the position that information imbalance is a key contributor
to agency capture.160 Barkow argues that industry players tend to have
access to a great amount of very specific and technical information, and
that the regulating agencies do not have this same information.161 With
this level of complexity, it is easy to see how a “revolving door” develops
between industry and the private sector.162 Revolving doors in federal
agencies are hardly a new phenomenon, but large imbalances in

at 843 (“The degree of independence from Presidential control an agency enjoys should
be determined only by looking at the agency’s enabling statute.”).
153. See Datla and Revesz, supra note 14, at 843.
154. See id. at 835, 843.
155. See id.
156. See Zywicki, supra note 87, at 885 (citing MAXWELL L. STEARNS & TODD J.
ZYWICKI, PUBLIC CHOICE CONCEPTS AND APPLICATIONS IN LAW 44–46 (2009)).
157. Zywicki, supra note 87, at 885.
158. Id.
159. Id. at 886; see also Barkow, supra note 2, at 23 (“[C]apture operates because of
the revolving-door phenomenon: the heads of agencies often anticipate entering or
returning to employment with the regulated industry once their government service
terminates.”) (citation omitted).
160. See Barkow, supra note 2, at 23.
161. See id.
162. See id. at 48.
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information across regulated industries make the CFPB’s revolving door
particularly susceptible to capture.163
III. A THIRD APPROACH: PRECEDENTS APPLIED TO FUNCTIONALISM
A. THE CFPB NEEDS A BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS
The research and case law on this matter demonstrates that there is
still room for debate regarding what the final structure of the CFPB will
look like. Three main concerns dominate the debate over the CFPB’s
structure and authority: lack of oversight, ease of agency capture, and the
CFPB’s wide range of administrative authority. This Note takes the
position that these three factors point to the need to restructure the CFPB,
and that the agency’s single-director structure is unconstitutional. In other
words, the D.C. Circuit’s initial decision in PHH I should stand.164 This
recommendation ultimately adopts elements from both the legalist and
protectionist views. It also suggests that Congress and the courts must
consider other factors relating to the CFPB’s level and scope of authority.
B. LACK OF OVERSIGHT
The first major issue with the CFPB’s current structure is its lack of
accountability to Congress and the executive branch.165 As discussed,
agency accountability is, at its core, intimately related to questions of
separation of powers.166 Also, the CFPB has a unique structure in terms
of leadership and external oversight.167 This Note argues that a board
structure would mitigate some of the unilateral authority of the Director
and the CFPB as a whole, while also adding a layer of accountability to
other board members.168
The history of administrative law jurisprudence and the history of
the separation of powers doctrine supports a board governance structure,

163.
164.
165.

See id. at 23.
See generally PHH I, 839 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 2016).
For the purposes of this Note, the “current structure” of the CFPB refers to the
agency’s form as of the decision in PHH II.
166. NLRB v. Noel Canning, 134 S. Ct. 2550, 2567 (2014).
167. See PHH I, 839 F.3d at 18.
168. See Ramirez, supra note 19, at 2052-54.
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as the court discussed in PHH I.169 In NLRB v. Noel Canning, Justice
Breyer acknowledged that questions of Presidential appointment powers
related to separation of powers require historical analysis rather than mere
textual interpretation.170 Breyer proposed that one possible way to rectify
this is to focus on what the “relative practice of government” has been
regarding the specific issue.171
The historical analysis employed by the Court regarding matters of
agency appointment powers supports the central premise of this Note.172
That is to say, historical practice favors the use of board governance in
agencies that have increased levels of authority such as the CFPB.173 This
historical analysis is particularly relevant in accountability matters related
to separation of powers.174 The goal of board governance is partially to
create an internal culture of deliberation in place of presidential or
congressional control.175 Under this analysis, the CFPB’s structure finds
no support in historical practice, nor in the relevant precedent.176 The
holding in Humphrey’s Executor was premised in large part on Congress’
desire to create “a body of experts” to lead the FTC, something wholly
absent from the CFPB’s structure.177 The Court saw the importance of
169. See PHH I, 839 F.3d at 7–8 (“[H]istory and tradition are critical factors in
separation of powers cases where constitutional text does not otherwise resolve the
matter.”); Noel Canning, 134 S. Ct. at 2560 (“The longstanding ‘practice of the
government,’ can inform this Court’s determination of ‘what the law is’” in a separationof-powers case) (quoting McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316, 401 (1819) and Marbury
v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 177 (1803)).
170. See Noel Canning, 134 S. Ct. at 2559-60.
171. Id.
172. See id.
173. See PHH I, 839 F.3d at 6 (“Because of their massive power and the absence of
Presidential supervision and direction, independent agencies pose a significant threat to
individual liberty and to the constitutional system of separation of powers and checks and
balances. To help mitigate the risk to individual liberty, the independent agencies,
although not checked by the President, have historically been headed by multiple
commissioners, directors, or board members who act as checks on one another.”).
174. Id. at 8.
175. Id.
176. See id. (“In light of the consistent historical practice under which independent
agencies have been headed by multiple commissioners or board members, and in light of
the threat to individual liberty posed by a single-Director independent agency, we
conclude that Humphrey’s Executor cannot be stretched to cover this novel agency
structure. We therefore hold that the CFPB is unconstitutionally structured.”) (citing
Humphrey’s Ex’r v. United States, 295 U.S. 602 (1935)).
177. See Humphrey’s Ex’r, 295 U.S. at 625.
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maintaining the independence of a deliberative body, thus upholding the
for-cause removal protocol.178
The PHH I court saw the historical weaknesses in the CFPB’s
argument that Humphrey’s Executor permitted a single-director
structure.179 As discussed, the FTC’s independent board was integral to
the Court’s decision in Humphrey’s Executor.180 During oral arguments,
the PHH I court asked the CFPB for examples of independent agencies
headed by a single administrator that have for-cause removal
protections.181 The CFPB could only come up with three examples in
response, none of which have the authority to pursue law enforcement
actions against members of the public for violating statutes or agency
rules.182
Regulatory agencies are naturally created by Congress and overseen
by both Congress and the President. They are not, in and of themselves,
part of their own branch. Each is created to serve a specific regulatory
function in a specialized area, but policy should come from the political
branches of government. Congress generally creates agencies with a “core
mission” in mind.183 This model of agencies as regulatory specialists
underscores that the agencies are to take their mandate from Congress.184
The CFPB’s accountability regime effectively reverses this
important construct of administrative law. Taken together, the CFPB’s
funding protocol, its accountability structure, and the inability to remove
the director, effectively render the agency nearly untouchable by both the
President and Congress.185 The agency’s freewheeling funding protocol is
one of the most significant aspects in this lack of oversight.186 Despite a
lack of logical consistency in the type of agencies with self-funding
authority, the CFPB is in a small class of other agencies that has both selffunding and a single director.187 By leaving so much authority in the hands
178.
179.
180.
181.
182.

Id. at 628-32.
See PHH I, 839 F.3d at 18.
See Humphrey’s Ex’r, 295 U.S. at 625.
PHH I, 839 F.3d at 18.
Id. The three examples that the CFPB provided were the Federal Housing
Finance Authority, the Social Security Administration, and the Office of Special Counsel.
Id.
183. See Lee, supra note 94, at 559.
184. Id.
185. See Zywicki, supra, note 87, at 888-93.
186. See id. at 888-89.
187. See Kruly, supra note 97, at 1751.
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of a single director, the CFPB’s structure violates the classic principalagent view of Congress’ relationship with agencies.188 The ultimate
example of the breakdown in this relationship is Congress’ inability to
even review the CFPB’s budget in the annual appropriations process.189
Another issue is the CFPB’s lack of accountability to the
President.190 This extends beyond the President’s inability to remove the
director at will.191 As discussed above, the CFPB is one of a few agencies
that is exempt from review by the Office of Information and Regulatory
Affairs (OIRA).192 Due to the CFPB Director’s great amount of authority,
the President is essentially powerless to coordinate the Bureau’s policies
with other government entities.193 Richard Pildes has summarized the
value of OIRA review, in that it alleviates some of the tunnel-vision
tendencies of specialized agencies, thus serving as an important check on
administrative authority.194 The CFPB is not the only agency exempt from
OIRA review, but it is unique in that it has a “single-mission” and a single
director.195 This structure generally suggests that an agency needs to
undergo OIRA review, but the CFPB remains exempt.196
The CFPB’s lack of a board structure compounds many of the
accountability issues discussed above. This Note takes the position that
the lack of formal oversight from the political branches, combined with a
lack of internal checks on the director, is likely to create a highly
unaccountable agency.197 The above comparison to the FTC is illustrative
of why the CFPB’s structure departs from the Supreme Court’s
understanding of Humphrey’s Executor. Unlike the FTC, the CFPB does
not have a body of experts to deliberate in favor of the optimal policy
outcome.198 The lack of checks on the CFPB effectively nullifies the
188.
189.
190.
191.
192.
193.
194.

See Lee, supra note 94, at 551.
See Block-Lieb, supra note 14, at 39-40.
See Kruly, supra note 97, at 1750-51; Zywicki, supra note 87, at 890-92.
See Kruly, supra note 97, at 1750-51; Zywicki, supra note 87, at 890-92.
See CHU & SHEDD, supra note 26, at 3; Zywicki, supra note 87, at 891.
See Zywicki, supra note 87, at 891–92.
See id. (citing Richard H. Pildes & Cass R. Sunstein, Reinventing the Regulatory
State, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 4 (1995)).
195. Zywicki, supra note 87, at 893.
196. Technically, the CFPB is part of the Federal Reserve, which is an independent
agency and thus exempt from OIRA review. Zywicki, supra note 87, at 893.
197. See id. at 893-94 (discussing the lack of judicial supervision of and internal
checks on the CFPB).
198. See PHH I, 839 F.3d 1, 26 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (“[U]nlike single-Director
independent agencies, multi-member independent agencies ‘can foster more deliberative
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ability of the political branches to monitor its activities, and does little to
alleviate the dangers of agency capture.199
C. EASE OF AGENCY CAPTURE
Simply stated, it is easier to capture one person than a group of
people. The CFPB emerged at a time of public outcry, with much of the
public demanding a robust consumer watchdog that had a particular,
consolidated focus on consumer protection.200 The structure of the CFPB
was lauded by many on the political left, despite the Bureau’s lack of
oversight.201 It is understandable why many in the government supported
this idea immediately after the recession. On the other hand, conflating
the need for a consumer watchdog with a requirement that the agency be
led by a single director is short-sighted in terms of the potential for agency
capture. Choosing the most efficient method to avoid capture of a single
director is as much a policy question as it is a legal question, but this Note
only addresses the legal matters. In other words, there is the possibility
that a single director may be constitutionally permissible at the CFPB or
any other agency, which is a question for the courts. But deciding if the
agency is sufficiently protected from capture is mainly a question for
Congress.
The potential for corruption at the highest levels of administrative
agencies remains a major topic in the American political discourse.202 Not

decision[-]making.’”) (quoting Datla and Revesz, supra note 14, at 794); Humphrey’s
Ex’r v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 625 (1935) (arguing that in creating the FTC,
Congress clearly intended for the Commission to serve as a “body of experts who shall
gain experience by length of service”); Ramirez, supra note 19.
199. The CFPB also has reduced judicial oversight, as the Dodd-Frank Act states that
the CFPB’s actions are entitled to immediate Chevron deference by the judiciary. This
gives the Bureau another tool to expand its policy reach, as it may interpret statutes as it
desires, so long as it fits within a reasonable interpretation. See Zywicki, supra note 87,
at 893.
200. See Block-Lieb, supra note 14, at 27.
201. See Sylvan Lane, Appeals Court Rules Consumer Bureau’s Structure is
Constitutional, THE HILL (Jan. 31, 2018), http://thehill.com/policy/finance/371603-dccircuit-consumer-bureaus-structure-is-constiutional[sic]
[https://perma.cc/9XGB-Z9
ZV].
202. See, e.g., Juliet Eilperin, Brady Dennis, and Josh Dawsey, Scott Pruitt’s Job In
Jeopardy Amid Expanding Ethics Issues, WASHINGTON POST (Apr. 6, 2018),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/energy-environment/wp/2018/04/05/top-epa-
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only are the governmental oversight protections on the CFPB anemic, the
Bureau’s structure is an invitation for powerful special interests to capture
its leadership. As discussed above, agency capture by private special
interests is frequently a principal concern for agency designers.203 Board
governance would add a layer of protection from outside industry actors,
resulting in a purer and more deliberate policy approach.204 While no
capture protection method is airtight, these particular protections seem to
be a priority among agency designers.205
Barkow’s research demonstrates that agencies that regulate wellfinanced agency players are often the most susceptible to capture by
special interests.206 This is a particular concern for the CFPB, since it
oversees some of the most fiscally robust private institutions in the world.
In fact, the CFPB’s very existence gives these institutions a more precise
“target” to capture than before the Bureau existed. The functions overseen
by the CFPB were previously executed by seven agencies, charged with
enforcing eighteen separate statutes.207 Certainly, there are common-sense
arguments for consolidating administrative functions under a single
regulatory entity. However, this aggregation of regulatory functions
indicates that the CFPB’s potential for capture is a legitimate concern.
Certainly, it is harder to capture a group of people than to capture one
person, but it is even harder to capture a group of entirely separate
agencies than to capture only one.
Because there are more capture concerns pertaining to multi-purpose
agencies, it is hardly surprising that several independent agencies have
leadership structures deliberately designed to impede agency capture.208
One notorious measure is a partisan balance requirement, meaning that
the board of directors (or other board structure titles, i.e. commissioners,

ethics-official-says-he-lacked-key-facts-about-pruitts-condo-rental/?utm_term=.bcc0f36
7b867 [https://perma.cc/N88V-R99M].
203. See Barkow, supra note 2, at 15.
204. See id.; see also Ramirez, supra note 19, at 2052-54 (discussing the benefits of
decision-making by a collective body rather than a single agency head).
205. See Barkow, supra note 2, at 15.
206. See id. at 21–33.
207. See PHH II, 881 F.3d 75, 145 (D.C. Cir. 2018) (citing 12 U.S.C. §§ 5481(12),
5581(a)(2), (b)). There is some disagreement as to exactly how many statutes were folded
into the CFPB’s mission, though the figure tends to fluctuate only slightly. See, e.g., PHH
I, 839 F.3d 1, 7 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (stating that the director is tasked with enforcing nineteen
statutes, as opposed to eighteen).
208. See Barkow, supra note 2, at 41.
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governors, etc.) has a mandated number of individuals from each of the
two major political parties at any given time.209 While this seems like a
measure best designed to prevent partisan capture from within the
government, it also helps mitigate the risks of capture from outside the
federal government, namely, from wealthy special interest groups.210
Barkow contends that this effectively encourages both ends of the
political spectrum to monitor different industry players, which, in turn,
balances the policy outcomes of the agency.211 One side will likely object
and issue a dissent if the other side implements overly strict sanctions, or
fails to sanction an errant institution.212 Ultimately, this is a question for
the courts to decide based on the amount of authority granted to the
agency. Specifically, the courts will need to decide how much liability for
capture Congress is permitted to give one individual charged with a
tremendous amount of authority over the American economy.
Regardless of the constitutional limits on agencies, the policy merits
of board governance are obvious from both the public and private sectors,
as well as from American history.213 There are also justifications for board
leadership that emanate from corporate law itself.214 Financial regulatory
agencies govern in a field of substantive law that places a premium on
collaboration, as board governance is the norm in corporate institutions.215
This preference for deliberation is evident from a few major themes of
corporate case law, such as the existence of litigation committees and the
legal mandates regarding shareholder voting rights.216
D. THE CFPB’S WIDE RANGE OF UNILATERAL AUTHORITY
Unlike many other independent agencies, the CFPB has a substantial
amount of enforcement authority.217 Specifically, the CFPB has two

209.
210.
211.
212.
213.

See id. at 39–41.
See id. at 41.
See id.
See id.
See THE FEDERALIST NO. 51 (James Madison) (discussing the importance of
deliberation between the two houses of Congress: “In republican government, the
legislative authority necessarily predominates.”).
214. Stephen M. Bainbridge, Why A Board? Group Decisionmaking in Corporate
Governance, 55 VAND. L. REV. 1, 3 (2002).
215. Id.
216. See, e.g., Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado, 430 A.2d 779 (Del. 1981).
217. See 12 U.S.C. §§§ 5563, 5564(a), (f).
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methods of enforcement: administrative enforcement and independent
litigation authority, both of which it may pursue without working through
the Department of Justice.218 The CFPB is also authorized to seek a wide
array of legal, equitable, and injunctive remedies for alleged violations.219
Financial penalties on mortgage lenders have been particularly
staggering, reaching amounts as high as $2 billion.220 The argument that
the CFPB’s range of authority is too large for a single director is not
bound to the severity of rendered judgments. Rather, the reasoning
focuses on how the Bureau is able to procure these remedies. Based on
the CFPB’s actions in its first five years of existence, it seems that the
subjects of CFPB litigation and administrative enforcement are strongly
encouraged to settle, rather than contest, its proposed sanction in court.221
There is a clear indication that even the threat of administrative action or
litigation poses a serious concern for financial entities.222 What this shows
is that the CFPB is not only able to secure large financial remedies, but
that it is frequently able to do so without ever even going to trial.223

218. Id. See also Donald C. Lampe, Ryan J. Richardson, The Consumer Financial
Protection Bureau at Five: A Survey of the Bureau’s Activities, 21 N.C. BANKING INST.
85, 109 (2017) (citing 12 U.S.C. §§§ 5563, 5564(a), (f)). The CFPB is authorized to file
suit in state and federal court, rather than going through the Department of Justice as most
other agencies are required to do. Id. In addition, there are no subject matter or personal
jurisdiction limits placed on litigation by the CFPB. Id.
219. Lampe & Richardson, supra note 218, at 109 (listing possible remedies,
including: “rescission or reformation of contracts, refund of moneys or return of real
property, restitution, disgorgement or compensation for unjust enrichment, payment of
damages or other monetary relief, public notification regarding the violation, including
the costs of notification, limits on the activities of functions of the person; and civil
money penalties against any person.”) (alteration in original) (citing 12 U.S.C. §
5565(a)(2)).
220. Id. at 123 (citing Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, CFPB, State
Authorities Order Ocwen to Provide $2 Billion in Relief to Homeowners for Servicing
Wrongs, CONSUMER FIN. PROTECTION BUREAU (Dec. 19, 2013), https://www.consumer
finance.gov/about-us/newsroom/cfpb-state-authorities-order-ocwen-to-provide-2billion-in-relief-to-homeowners-for-servicing-wrongs/ [https://perma.cc/S73D-N2B2]).
221. Id. at 117–18 (“In addition to the 115 public actions on which the Bureau reached
a final disposition between July 21, 2011, and July 21, 2016, the Bureau in that same
period filed an additional twenty-two actions that remained pending and in contest. Of
these twenty-two actions, two were pending in the administrative forum and twenty were
pending in federal court.”).
222. Id.
223. Id.
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The PHH I court placed great emphasis on the CFPB’s inherent
authority as a key reason for the Bureau’s perceived lack of
constitutionality.224 Then-Judge Kavanaugh’s majority opinion stressed
several grants of authority that the court felt could not be placed in the
hands of a single individual.225 The court was particularly troubled by the
CFPB’s ability to bring actions against private citizens—specifically, the
Bureau’s ability to enforce the now-consolidated consumer protection
statutes, and the ability to impose fines and other punishments.226
Kavanaugh summarized the director’s amount of authority by saying, “the
Director of the CFPB possesses enormous power over American business,
American consumers, and the overall U.S. economy.”227 The majority in
Free Enterprise Fund expressed a similar sentiment, describing the
PCAOB as “a [g]overnment-created, [g]overnment-appointed entity, with
expansive powers to govern an entire industry.”228 Kavanaugh’s position
on the director’s level of authority can be broken down into two major
principles.229 First, from a legalist perspective, the CFPB’s statutory grant
of authority surpasses the permissible authority typically given to
independent agencies.230 Second, from a protectionist perspective, the
CFPB’s scope of responsibility in the American economy is too broad to
be managed by a single person.231 This Note argues that both of these
positions are correct.
First, this Note takes the position that the PHH I court was correct in
its view that the CFPB was given an unprecedented level of authority.232
As discussed above, the CFPB was born out of a desire to consolidate
several regulatory functions into one entity charged with a generally
defined concept of consumer protection.233 Much of the CFPB’s specific

224.
225.
226.
227.
228.

See PHH I, 839 F.3d 1, 7 (D.C. Cir. 2016).
Id. at 6–7, 15.
Id. at 20.
Id. at 7.
See Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477, 485

(2010).
229. See PHH I, 839 F.3d at 7.
230. Id.
231. Id.
232. See id. at 6 (“[N]o independent agency exercising substantial executive authority
has ever been headed by a single person. Until now.” (emphasis in original)).
233. See PHH II, 881 F.3d 75, 145 (D.C. Cir. 2018) (en banc) (citing 12 U.S.C. §§§
5481(12), 5581(a)(2), (b)); Block-Lieb, supra note 14, at 27.
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authority from its statutory foundation is rather vague and, thus, ripe for
authoritative manipulation.234
In the spirit of consumer protection, the CFPB has the ability to
regulate “unfair, deceptive, or abusive” business practices and
products.235 While this seems like a fairly innocuous statutory mandate,
deeper examination reveals that it can easily be coopted into allowing the
Bureau a vast and ill-defined amount of power to target financial
entities.236 By imposing fines, litigating, and imposing excessive rules, the
CFPB has broad authority to deem certain products or business practices
“abusive,” thereby potentially removing them from the market
altogether.237 Perhaps most threatening is that this statute leaves open the
possibility for the Bureau to blur the lines of its regulatory boundaries.238
For example, one key area that the Bureau regulates is consumer credit.239
Obviously, this is an industry that requires a degree of risk in order to
properly function. Based on the “abusive practices” standard articulated
above, the Bureau could conceivably use its enforcement authority to
drive any new or innovative lending practice out of the market
completely.240 Concerns about the CFPB’s ability to flexibly apply the
“abusive” standard are affirmed by the CFPB’s unwillingness to define
the term, opting instead to make ad hoc judgments on which regulated
practices meet this standard.241
This potential for exploitation is compounded by the director’s vast
unilateral authority.242 The opportunity for judicial review is the only clear
check on the director’s authority, but that would require that the director
actually do something outside the bounds of his statutory grant of
authority.243 The court in PHH I addressed this particular issue and found
that the director alone can enforce the rules of the Bureau, and that he
234.
235.

See Zywicki, supra note 87, at 917.
See id. at 917–18 (quoting Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer
Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111–203, § 1036(a)(1)(B), 124 Stat. 1376, 2010 (2010)
(codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5536(a)(1)(B) (Supp. IV 2011)).
236. See id. at 917–23.
237. See id.
238. See id. at 922.
239. See PHH I, 839 F.3d 1, 38 (D.C. Cir. 2016); Zywicki, supra note 87, at 922–23.
240. See Zywicki, supra note 87, at 922–23.
241. See id. at 922.
242. See PHH I, 839 F.3d at 7 (“The Director alone decides what rules to issue; how
to enforce, when to enforce, and against whom to enforce the law; and what sanctions
and penalties to impose on violators of the law.”).
243. Id.
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alone can decide when he wants to do so and against whom.244 For this
reason, the court said, the mere possibility of judicial review has never
been held to be a sufficient protection in a separation of powers case.245
The statutory regime surrounding the CFPB’s enforcement and litigation
authority will likely encourage the Bureau to pursue enforcement actions
instead of using its rulemaking authority.246 In the spirit of creating a
strong watchdog agency, Congress effectively gave the CFPB license to
pursue enforcement before undertaking any rulemaking procedures.247
The PHH II court responded to many of the concerns raised by the
panel by looking to the early administrative precedents and arguing that
they supported the CFPB’s structure.248 The PHH II court mainly
addressed this by holding that the CFPB’s structural scheme was
permitted under the early administrative cases, even though the structure
was novel in its conception.249 In other words, the court found that simply
because this particular scheme had not been tried before did not mean that
it did not fit within the range of permissible administrative governance
schemes.250 The PHH II court took a purely functional approach with
regard to the scope of the CFPB’s authority in the market, finding that the
CFPB had a sufficiently limited scope of authority to justify having a
single director.251
This leads to the second principle within Kavanaugh’s majority
opinion, that the CFPB regulates a portion of the American economy that
is too large to be overseen by a single individual.252 This Note agrees with
this position, but adds that this analysis should not be limited to the types
of industry regulated by the agency. The analysis should also include an
244.
245.
246.

Id.
Id.
See Zywicki, supra note 87, at 923–24 (citing Dodd-Frank Act § 111(b)(1)-(2),
124 Stat. at 1392–93; § 1011(a), 124 Stat. at 1964; § 1022(b)(2)(A)(i), 124 Stat. at 1980;
§ 1023(c)(3)(B), 124 Stat. at 1986; § 1022(b)(2)(B), 124 Stat. at 1981; § 1023(c)(3)(A),
124 Stat. at 1985).
247. See id.
248. See PHH II, 881 F.3d 75, 84–95 (D.C. Cir. 2018) (en banc).
249. Id. at 103 (“Other constitutional principles beyond novelty must establish why a
specific regime is problematic.”).
250. Id.
251. Id. at 102 (“In sum, under the requisite functional analysis, the CFPB’s authority
is more cabined than either the FTC’s or the independent counsel’s, and the agency is
part of a longstanding tradition, dating back to the founding of the Republic, of financial
regulators with a modicum of independence from Presidential will.”).
252. See PHH I, 839 F.3d 1, 6-7 (D.C. Cir. 2016).
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evaluation of the size of the economic space being regulated. The CFPB
will clearly have a foothold in some of the largest financial institutions in
the nation, and indeed, the world. The specific areas of regulation simply
do not provide a complete picture of the CFPB’s economic and regulatory
magnitude.
This Note takes the position that the CFPB can have wide-reaching
impacts well beyond its defined jurisdiction, and that Congress and the
courts should evaluate the possible impacts that the agency could inflict
on the American economy. Stated more simply, the analysis should
account for the impact of potential regulatory consequences, not just
specific agency functions. This was a point of contention in the PHH
cases, with the panel opinion holding that “the CFPB lacks [a] critical
check and structural constitutional protection, yet wields vast power over
the U.S. economy.”253 The en banc opinion countered this mode of
analysis, holding that it “turn[s] not on the breadth of the FTC’s
jurisdiction or on its social and economic impact, but on its character as a
financial and commercial regulator.”254
While this is certainly a question for the CFPB, it is also an issue for
financial regulatory agencies generally.255 The Enron disaster of 2002 is
a powerful example of the domino effect that often results from
administrative enforcement and litigation.256 The scope of regulatory
authority is particularly important in white collar litigation.257 Corporate
entities, including those under the supervision of the CFPB, face great
risk simply by going to criminal trial or entering civil litigation.258 This is
sometimes called the “trial penalty,” implying that corporate entities have
a unique trait in that their punishment often results from an indictment or
from a threat of sanction, rather than from a verdict.259 The Enron scandal

253.
254.
255.
256.

Id. at 8 (internal punctuation omitted).
PHH II, 881 F.3d 75, 102 (D.C. Cir. 2018) (en banc).
Id.
The PCAOB did not exist at the time of Arthur Andersen’s collapse. Rather, the
PCAOB was created as part of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act as a response to alleged oversight
by auditors employed by Arthur Andersen while serving Enron. See supra Part I.
257. Ellen S. Podgor, White Collar Innocence: Irrelevant in the High Stakes Risk
Game, 85 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 77, 77–78 (2010) (“[O]ur existing legal system places the
risk of going to trial, and in some cases even being charged with a crime, so high, that
innocence and guilt no longer become the real considerations.”).
258. Id.
259. Id.
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highlighted the possible impacts of the trial penalty.260 The important part
of the Enron collapse for these purposes is not the actual regulatory
failings that led to the energy giant’s demise, but rather the subsequent
folding of Arthur Andersen, once a powerhouse in the public accounting
field and one of the “Big Five” professional services firms.261 Andersen’s
eventual downfall exemplifies the trial penalty’s potentially devastating
impacts.262 Even though the judgment against Andersen was later
reversed, the damage caused by the original conviction, and even the
indictment, were too great to revive the firm.263
Andersen met its demise after having served as Enron’s public
auditor during the time in controversy.264 Whether or not Andersen
engaged in wrongdoing worthy of its collapse is not evaluated here.
However, this milestone in American corporate law had great
implications for the regulatory state, and the level of authority it is able to
exert on private industry.265 Mere implication in the Enron matter brought
about the end of Andersen.266 There was never a court order requiring that
the firm shut its doors.267 The simple possibility of an indictment brought
about the collapse of the firm long before any conviction was rendered.268
The Enron controversy became widely-publicized in late 2001, and
Andersen was indicted on March 14, 2002.269 Before an indictment had
even been issued, Andersen had already begun to lose a substantial
amount of clients, resulting in a devastating blow to its bottom line and
260.
261.

Id.
See Bloomberg News, Coopers, Price Waterhouse Plan to Merge, L.A. TIMES,
(Sept. 19, 1997), http://articles.latimes.com/1997/sep/19/business/fi-33845 [https://
perma.cc/9EJP-HNGF].
262. See Podgor, supra note 257, at 79.
263. See id.
264. See Ken Brown & Ianthe Jeanne Dugan, Arthur Andersen’s Fall From Grace Is
a Sad Tale of Greed and Miscues, WALL STREET J., (June 7, 2002 12:01 AM),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB1023409436545200 [https://perma.cc/RU2E-T9BM].
265. See Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477, 48485 (2010).
266. See generally Arthur Andersen LLP v. United States, 544 U.S. 696 (2005).
267. Id.
268. See Dan Ackman, Was Arthur Andersen a Mistake?, FORBES (June 1, 2005, 9:46
AM),
https://www.forbes.com/2005/06/01/cx_da_0601topnews.html#60aff71649a0
[https://perma.cc/D6LN-BVRJ].
269. See Timeline: A Chronology of Enron Corp., N.Y. TIMES, (Jan. 18, 2006),
https://www.nytimes.com/2006/01/18/business/worldbusiness/timeline-a-chronologyof-enron-corp.html [https://perma.cc/8467-THM8].
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its ability to pay its partners and employees.270 After the indictment,
clients continued to fire the firm, its reputation badly tarnished.271 This
attrition of business continued until the firm was forced to shut its doors
in August 2002, putting thousands of employees out of work.272
The Andersen matter demonstrated the dramatic impact government
penalties can have on financial institutions.273 An indictment so powerful
that it can put thousands of employees out of work has clear implications
for the CFPB. The Bureau is charged with overseeing regulatory matters
in some of the nation’s largest financial institutions, “cover[ing] most
consumer credit products, including mortgages, student loans and credit
cards.”274 Clearly, the CFPB’s targeted regulatory areas are crucial
aspects of the American economy. While the CFPB’s regulatory mission
may appear narrowly confined, the number of employees and amount of
money it regulates is incredibly vast.275 The lesson from the Andersen
matter may be that the mere ability to pursue criminal or civil sanctions
against a corporate entity can have an impact reaching far beyond any
specific controversy, and possibly going beyond the intended
consequences.276

270. See Cassell Bryan-Low & Jon E. Hilsenrath, Freddie Mac Is Latest Firm To
Dismiss Arthur Andersen, WALL STREET J., (Mar. 7, 2002, 12:01 AM), https://www.wsj.
com/articles/SB1015428082376916440 [https://perma.cc/3LZN-AAX9]; see also
Elizabeth K. Ainslie, Indicting Corporations Revisited: Lessons of the Arthur Andersen
Prosecution, 43 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 107, 109 (2006).
271. See Penelope Patsuris, Andersen Client Loss Could Pile Up, FORBES (Mar 7,
2002, 03:37 PM), https://www.forbes.com/2002/03/07/0307andersen.html#59393881
5001 [https://perma.cc/L82S-4KUK]; ABC News, Arthur Andersen Goes Out of
Business, (Aug. 31, 2002), http://abcnews.go.com/Business/Decade/arthur-andersenbusiness/story?id=9279255 [https://perma.cc/49CS-A5MD].
272. See Bryan-Low & Hilsenrath, supra note 270; ABC News, supra note 271.
273. See Podgor, supra note 257, at 79; see also Bryan-Low & Hilsenrath, supra note
270; ABC News, supra note 271.
274. See PHH II, 881 F.3d 75, 145 (D.C. Cir. 2018) (en banc); see also PHH 1, 839
F.3d 1, 7.
275. See PHH I, 839 F.3d 1, 7 (D.C. Cir. 2016).
276. See Ainslie, supra note 270, at 115 (“It seems likely, for instance, that the
Houston office of Arthur Andersen had a different corporate culture from the Arthur
Andersen office in Anchorage, Alaska, and it may well be, therefore, that a suspension
of practice privileges before the SEC imposed upon many or perhaps all of the Houston
partners would have been a very serious sanction without actually punishing offices
whose corporate culture was not renegade.”).
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CONCLUSION
The totality of administrative law jurisprudence—specifically,
decisions regarding capture protections—suggests that there is a sliding
scale of constitutionally permissible agency structures. It is clear that
within that scale, there is a point at which a given agency structure can,
itself, be unconstitutional. The debate over whether a given agency
structure is permissible is primarily a debate over which standards to
apply in the respective analysis. Some scholars take the “legalist”
position, looking only to relevant statutes and the confines of relevant
precedent. Others take the “protectionist” position, believing that
protection from capture is inherent in the DNA of all independent
agencies. Far from being a new question for the judiciary, the CFPB has
forced Congress and the courts to apply familiar questions to a novel
agency design. This Note takes the position that Congress and the courts
should place greater emphasis on the scope of agency authority in
designing agencies. The approach suggested in this Note adopts aspects
of the legalist and protectionist approaches, in conjunction with
heightened functional analysis, amounting to a third approach. These
questions are critically important to the CFPB, and to the future of
financial regulatory jurisprudence as a whole.
As applied to the matter at hand, this Note takes the position that the
CFPB is unconstitutional under the direction of a single administrator.
This design implicates serious issues regarding separation of powers and
the potential for agency capture, as well as an inordinate amount of
authority in the hands of a single bureaucrat. In sum, this Note
recommends that the agency be restructured as a board of administrators
with staggered terms, who can only be removed by the President for
cause. Congress and the courts have resorted to this design throughout the
history of the administrative state and should implement it at the CFPB.

